

2 JUL 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT: Letter to Mr. Loy Henderson Concerning Criticism
of Radio Liberation Programs.
REFERENCE: Your Instructions by Telephone on 1 July.

This memorandum suggests action on the part of the DD/P.

In accordance with reference instructions, I attach hereto
a suggested draft of a letter to be sent over your signature to
Mr. Loy Henderson in connection with Mr. Isaac Don Levine's
criticism of Radio Liberation programs.

THE ATTACHED COPY

CORD MEYER, JR.
Chief

International Organizations Division

Attachment

Letter for DD/P's signature

C/IO [redacted] ha (2 July 1958)

Distribution:

- orig & 1 - addressee w/att.
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(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE _____)

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10-5248

JUL 1958

Mr. Loy Henderson
Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Loy:

Mr. Allen Dulles has asked me to inform you that we have reviewed the material concerning Radio Liberation Russian language broadcasts which Mr. Isaac Don Levine left with you in April. Mr. Levine was certainly correct and helpful to us in identifying a number of errors in judgment but we found nowhere any substantiation of his charges that the program in question reflected subversion or appeasement. Certain administrative steps have been taken within Radio Liberation to improve the quality of the news programs. However, I should add that Mr. Levine, in his understandably quick review, drew conclusions in a number of cases which were not supported by thorough reading of the scripts.

Mr. Dulles thought you would want to know these things inasmuch as Mr. Levine took his criticism to you. A copy of our findings in this matter, based on an analysis of the same scripts in the original language which Mr. Levine commented upon, is attached for such study as you may wish to give it.

Because we value Mr. Levine's contribution to this project and do not wish to put him on the defensive, we propose to discuss our findings orally with him, rather than to show him the full report; and we would appreciate knowing if this coincides with your own view as to how the matter should be handled with him.

Sincerely,

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

Frank G. Wisner
Deputy Director, Plans.

1 Attachment:

42-page Report of Findings

C/IO [redacted] (2 July 1958)

Distribution:

orig ~~1~~ - addressee
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

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27 JUN 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Criticism of Radio Liberation Russian
Language Programs

REFERENCE: IG Memorandum for DCI dated 19 June 1958.

I concur in the recommendations made therein with one exception:
it is suggested that the following be substituted for paragraph 3c:

"3c. that you express to Mr. Henderson your belief
that the most tactful way to handle this will be for
you to discuss the findings orally with Mr. Levine
rather than to show him the full report, and that
you would appreciate his (Henderson's) views on this
approach".



STAT

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: DDCI

10-4781

19 June 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Criticism of Radio Liberation Russian Language Programs

REFERENCE : Undated Memorandum from C/IO to DCI (attached)

1. This memorandum contains recommendations for your approval, in paragraph 3.

2. In accordance with your instruction I have worked with Chief, IO, in reviewing the allegations made by Messrs. Isaac Don Levine and Eugene Lyons concerning "harmful, perverse, pro-Soviet items" which they claimed were carried by Radio Liberation. I have reviewed the material prepared by the IO Division on these broadcasts and concur with the views of the Chief, IO Division, that Mr. Levine's criticisms were highly exaggerated. While there obviously were some errors of judgment and ineptness, there is no proof of subversion or appeasement. The IO Division has already taken steps to improve the direction of Radio Liberation, and these changes appear to be in good order.

3. I have discussed this matter with the Chief, IO Division, and consequently make the following recommendations, with which I believe he is in agreement:

- a. that inasmuch as Mr. Levine took his criticisms initially to Loy Henderson, that you advise Mr. Henderson

that a thorough review has been made of the charges which does not substantiate the allegations;

b. that if Mr. Henderson so desires, a copy of the report be made available to him for such study as he wishes to make of it;

c. that you suggest to Mr. Henderson that he may wish to talk to Levine about this;

d. following the above, that you invite Levine and Lyons to return to Washington and go over the material with them.

STAT



Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

The recommendations contained in paragraph are approved:

Director of Central Intelligence

cc: DDCI
cc: C/IO Division

Ref/P3-9534

REFERENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
Chief, Psychological and Paramilitary Staff

SUBJECT: Criticism of Radio Liberation Russian Language Programs.

This memorandum is for information only, particular reference is made to paragraph 1.

1. In a letter of 15 March 1958 to Mr. Howland Sargeant, Mr. Isaac Don Levine cited forty-five items out of fifty complete daily Radio Liberation Russian-language programs for the period October 1957 - February 1958 which he termed "harmful, perverse, pro-Soviet items which follow a definite pattern of appeasement of Red imperialism and which show an unmistakable pattern of infiltration by elements set upon subverting from within the purposes and policies of Radio Liberation." IO Division has analyzed the same original script material reviewed and commented upon by Mr. Levine. The text of this analysis is attached (Tab A). The Division's conclusions, based on this analysis, follow:

- a. No substantiation of Mr. Levine's charges of appeasement and subversion is found.
- b. Some of the items to which Mr. Levine objected do display errors of judgment and ineptness in detailed treatment.
- c. Whole categories of programs attacked by Mr. Levine follow a basically sound propaganda line, although some errors in the detailed implementation of that line were committed.
- d. Mr. Levine has given an erroneous impression of the spirit and content of a large number of the scripts he cited,

as well as

as well as of RL's over-all handling of a given subject.

c. The nature of many of Mr. Levine's comments raises the question whether he is, in fact, in agreement with RL's assigned role and mission.

2. Mr. Levine was fully justified in objecting to some poorly conceived programs and to errors in details of others, although many of his generalized conclusions were unfounded or based on mistaken premises. Outstanding among the poorly conceived programs were the two Mao scripts (p. 1, Tab A), the news report of Rep. Cellar's harsh criticism of Secretary of State Dulles (and the error concerning the Congressman's Party affiliation) (p. 20, Tab A), and the broadcast in substantial part of the Kennan lectures (pp. 23 - 26, Tab A). Concerning the latter, it should be noted that, although the last four lectures were condensed for broadcast by RL, although RL dissociated itself from Kennan's foreign policy views and carried material opposing these views, RL nevertheless very evidently overplayed the lectures. Objection properly could be taken also to errors of commission or omission in the detailed handling of other RL programs. Thus, for example, greater care should have been taken in news reports of strikes in the West, both to avoid creating the impression of serious social disturbance and to point up the rights and achievements of free labor (pp. 9, 29 - 30, Tab A). The misquoted reference to U.S. publication of the Djilas book was a grievous error (p. 6, Tab A). Also, RL's dissent with State Department's action in the Bronstein passport case, while permissible in principle, should have been more restrained in its criticism (p. 17, Tab A).

3. RL operates on the basic propaganda premise that it must often report events, the immediate impact of which may be unfavorable to the U.S. and the West, so that, having displayed its "objectivity" to its listeners, it could effectively place these events into proper perspective. This was the approach followed in the cases, for example, of Sputnik and its resultant repercussions in the re-evaluations of American life and NATO. It is quite probable that RL may have gone too far to condition its audience in some cases. Nevertheless, programs such as those dealing with Sputnik and other significant world happenings clearly attempted to wring the maximum propaganda advantage from their subjects.

4. The methods employed by Mr. Levine in analyzing RL's scripts led, in the majority of cases (26 out of 45), to a significant distortion of their character and of RL's handling of individual subjects. This became evident when whole sentences, instead of fragments of sentences, when complete paragraphs, instead of parts of paragraphs,

when whole

when whole scripts, instead of random passages, and when a number of related programs, instead of isolated programs, were examined. Among the materials thus shown to have been misrepresented were the programs on the Warsaw Po Prostu demonstrations (pp. 1 - 2, Tab A); on Sputnik and the U.S. and NATO re-evaluations (pp. 3, 6 - 8, 11 - 12, 38 - 39; 21 - 23; 30 - 32, Tab A); the dialogue on the Bolshevik Revolution (pp. 9 - 10; Tab A); the feature on the October revolutions and Zhukov's dismissal (pp. 10 - 11, Tab A); the Fast and Pratley interviews (pp. 14 - 16; 26 - 29, Tab A); the programs on the N.Y. subway strike (pp. 29 - 30, Tab A), the Egypt-Syria merger (pp. 39 - 40, Tab A), the U.S.-USSR Exchange Agreement (pp. 35 - 38, Tab A) and the Summit Conference (pp. 41 - 42, Tab A). Even on the matter of the Kennan biography, Mr. Levine's quotation of only part of a sentence created a seriously misleading impression (p. 26, Tab A).

5. It is not clear whether Mr. Levine's real quarrel is with the manner in which RL consistently tries to implement its assigned role, as recently formalized in the official paper "Gray Broadcasting Policy Toward the Soviet Union," or with that policy, itself. He is aware generally, however, that in place of its former posture of fostering a violent, revolutionary overthrow of the Soviet regime, with its concomitant vilifying denunciatory and carping propaganda approach, RL now follows the concept of supporting and stimulating those actual and latent forces in Soviet society which can weaken the fabric of totalitarian Party control and prepare the ground for the eventual elimination, in one way or another, of the Party dictatorship. Carrying out this "evolutionary" mission means that RL attempts to stimulate the thinking of the Soviet people, and primarily of the power elite groups, in a calm, reasoned manner. RL's criticism of Soviet domestic and international policies must be serious and thoughtful; the Soviet audience must be presented with a variety of thought-provoking material. To win the confidence of its listeners and to communicate better with them, RL tries to appear as an independent representative of their legitimate interests, utilizing their outlook and frames of reference. This mission and its implementation are much more difficult than was RL's former role, and the possibility of error is greater. All the more stringent, therefore, must be the pre-broadcast controls and post-broadcast reviews. RL is working harder in this direction.

6. [] with the concurrence of Chief, IO Division, already has effected changes in personnel assignments designed both to strengthen the Russian language desk supervision in Munich and to establish a firmer pre-broadcast control of program content. By

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concentrating the latter function in a single individual of senior rank with an established reputation as an able anti-Soviet propagandist (Malanuth), it is hoped to prevent a recurrence of errors of judgment and lack of skilled professional treatment which some of the programs have reflected. Additionally, the Radio Liberation management in New York is now negotiating with a likely candidate to replace the present head of the News Desk in Munich.

7. As an added precaution, IO Division has enlisted the assistance of the Director of Security and SR Division in a security re-appraisal, now in progress, of all Radio Liberation personnel concerned with Russian language programs.

8. Also appended is an analysis of Mr. Levine's charges by a committee of members of RL's supervisory staff in Munich (Tab B). This analysis was undertaken independently of the IO study, with which it is in basic agreement. As a further refutation of Mr. Levine's charge of a deliberate pattern of subversion, Munich points out that the sources and circumstances under which the programs were prepared were much too varied to permit such a pattern.

9. A copy of Mr. Levine's letter of 15 March 1958 to also is attached (Tab C).

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CORD MEYER, JR.
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachments, 3
Tabs A, B, C

cc: Inspector General, w/att.

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Part I

Mao Scripts; Author, V. Frank; 16, 23 November 1957.

These scripts are truly deplorable. Their portrayal of Mao as a great Communist revolutionary independent of Moscow and of his system as a more humane form of Communism than the Soviet system, just as Mao himself is a "more enlightened despot" than Khrushchev -- this portrayal is obviously intended to serve the propaganda objective of drawing, for the benefit of the Soviet audience, an invidious comparison between Mao and the Chinese Communist system and the Soviet leadership and their system, to the detriment of the latter. This basic propaganda aim may have had some merit if the Chinese had continued the support they seemed to have given the more moderate, independent-minded Communist elements in Eastern Europe in 1956 and if the "flowers" were really allowed to bloom in China. In that case, useful materials would have been at hand to make a meaningfully invidious comparison; in any event, the whole matter would have had to be handled in a radically different manner. However, these scripts were broadcast in November 1957, by which time Mao had made clear in no uncertain terms that he was backing Moscow's East Europe policy and that he was allergic to "flowers." (Radio Liberation, of course, carried many items on the fate of the "flowers" policy; as for other aspects of the Chinese domestic scene, only on 12 October a program was devoted to peasant repression in China, referring to methods of terror, comparable to Stalin's, to foist collectives on the countryside.) In addition, Mao had just endorsed CPSU leadership of the world Communist movement and Moscow's leadership of the communist state camp in the most unequivocal terms he had perhaps ever used. All this reduced the scripts to shambles.

Quite regardless of the appropriateness of the propaganda motivation of the scripts, the material used and the manner of argumentation were very poor, wildly misleading, naive, confused and confusing.

Although this is quite secondary, Mr. Levine's comments about the references to the Soviet Supreme Soviet can be answered thus: it would seem manifestly impractical to qualify every reference to Soviet institutions with interpretive remarks; to do so would lend too ponderous and propagandistic a style to RL's programs.

Part II

1. News Item on Warsaw Demonstrations; News Desk, 9 October 1957.

Mr. Levine's

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Mr. Levine's complaint seems unjustified. The item to which he objects is a news report, carried during the first part of the day of 9 October of the latest in a series of disorders in Warsaw over the closing of Po Prostu. As a news item, it was quite proper to quote the official Warsaw announcement concerning the events. RL did not show itself "on the side of Communist order," nor did it "gloat over the report that students did not participate in the demonstrations." First, the concluding portion of the news item indicated quite clearly that students were agitated over the closure of Po Prostu, even though they may not have taken part in the particular demonstration reported; and the news item further reported the official Warsaw admission that the police had acted indiscriminately towards participants in and mere spectators of the demonstration. Secondly, during the remaining twelve hours of 9 October and throughout the following day, RL carried a news item which stated that "students of higher educational institutions in Warsaw had openly protested against the suppression of Po Prostu," and which cited reports in the Warsaw press that "more than 100 youths and students, who were arrested during the disorders, will be brought to trial." Thus, contrary to Mr. Levine's implications, the radio did report subsequent dispatches about the arrest and trial of youths and students.

Finally, on 10 October, RL carried an analysis of the events in its "Notes on the News of the Day" program (News Desk) -- a type of program where interpretative treatment for a subtly directed propaganda objective is feasible. In this program, RL spoke of "the students' demonstrations demanding the repeal of the government order suppressing Po Prostu and calling forth police intervention." The program went on to analyze the underlying significance of these events as the latest manifestation of the movement in the satellites of popular defiance of Communist authority, a manifestation of the "possibility of an open, though still very limited, opposition to the government." The radio asked how long it will take for this movement to spread to the center (Russia) and closed with a reference to the leadership of the Hungarian Revolution by youth, workers and students. The last statement of the broadcast reads as follows:

The events which have just taken place in Warsaw are another confirmation of the fact that the youth in Communist countries are in the vanguard of the forces struggling for freedom. It is precisely the youth which will build the historical future of these countries."

The main lines of this program were picked up again and given extended treatment in the "Weekly News Review" (News Desk) of 14 October.

2. Sputnik Comment;

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2. Sputnik Comment; Review of the Press program; News Desk, 9 October 1957.

The following observations should be borne in mind when considering the large number of "Sputnik" programs to which Mr. Levine has objected. The launching of the Soviet satellites quite obviously posed a difficult problem for all anti-Communist spokesmen and media, official, non-official and covert. Particularly for media directed to the Soviet audience was there a need to avoid a "sour-grapes" approach, to avoid an appearance of belittling the great achievement Sputnik obviously represented. Probably only through unbegrudging praise could the Soviet audience be receptive to a balanced picture attempting to place Sputnik in perspective. It is, indeed, possible that RL went too far in this effort to condition its listeners to accept the reservations it had to offer on the meaning of Sputnik, but this would be a matter of judgment, not of insidious intent.

The program under discussion should be looked upon as a whole program devoted to a single topic, rather than considering its component parts in isolation from one another. Further, it is not correct to say that the excerpts from the British press are lacking in sobering thoughts: The London Times points out that the Soviet government can assign tremendous resources to the execution of any project "because it need not concern itself with public opinion"; the Daily Telegraph makes the point that "we can only express our hope that the USSR may strive with the same determination for the evolution of mankind in the direction of creating a better world." This last assertion is much the same point as that made in the broadcast excerpt from the New York Times, for which Mr. Levine expressed his approval. It is, as a matter of fact, more explicitly directed at the USSR than was the New York Times comment, which spoke only of the general characteristic of modern times, in which "man's achievements in mastering the natural world are not accompanied by analogous successes in human relations."

3. News Item on Warsaw Sputnik Comment; News Desk, 10 October 1957.

One may justifiably object to this news item, not so much because it bears the information, well known to the Soviet people, that Sputnik had passed over Washington, but because the Polish writer's conclusions about the significance of Sputnik for the disarmament talks are obscure, as indeed the writer himself admits. There is manifestly no need to cite a Polish writer for the obvious fact that, although it is difficult to foresee what course the disarmament negotiations will take now, there is nevertheless, no doubt that the earth satellite will play a certain

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role in the negotiations. This, by the way, is the correct quote -- Mr. Levine's ellipsis is misleading. To attribute to the Warsaw item the implication that Sputnik "will cow the U.S. in the disarmament talks" is to attribute a greater clarity of message than the item merits, judging at least from that portion of it which RL carried.

4. News Commentary on Sputnik; New York Program Department,
10 October 1957.

Mr. Levine's comments on this editorial treatment of Sputnik is grossly unjust. First of all, the comments on the relative freedom of inquiry of Soviet physical scientists were not "accompanied by" the constructive moral; the "moral" was clearly the purpose of the program, with Sputnik as a "peg to hang it on. Therefore, it is quite misleading to say that commentary on the paragraph dealing with freedom of scientific inquiry would be superfluous except for the fact that it was accompanied by a 'constructive moral'."

As for the constructive moral itself: The New York Program Department was most skillful in utilizing Sputnik and what it meant in terms of scientific freedom to present, in a relevant and enforced manner, a most overt and direct appeal for freedom for all strata of Soviet society and for all pursuits: Freedom of inquiry, of experiment, the free exchange of opinion and information are necessary in all spheres of human thought and activity -- in the physical and social sciences, in production, in the humanities, and, first of all, in those fields which directly serve man. Otherwise, our life will be like the artificial earth satellite, that metallic sphere with complicated instruments, but without a sign of life. In support of this view, the broadcast then went on to quote two lines from a poem highly critical of Soviet values, written by a Soviet writer and officially condemned.

The concluding lines of this broadcast are:

. . . these (scientific) achievements have been created not on the basis of the works of Karl Marx of a hundred years ago, not on the basis of articles by Lenin or Stalin, but by the efforts of the ever developing creative thought of scientists and engineers. The signals from Sputnik remind us that all spheres of human knowledge and activity must be liberated from Party control. They must be granted the fullest opportunity to develop under conditions of creative freedom. (Emphasis in original)

The cited program material contradicts Mr. Levine's contention that this program contains "not a word about liberation from dictatorship,

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and that it is "just an appeaser's plea for reform." The calm, reasoning tone of the program is thoroughly in consonance with stated RL broadcast policy, which is to eschew crude vilification and denunciation. It is also good propaganda.

5. Announcement on the Sputnik program and Sputnik Feature; Russian Desk, 12 October 1957.

The general observations made earlier on RL's Sputnik programs apply here. However, it should be pointed out that the over-all program for 12 October contains, in addition to the material cited by Mr. Levine, a satirical sketch on the Sputnik theme which is intended to demonstrate the irrelevance and ironic contrast of Sputnik to the daily life of the Soviet citizen. The message of this satire can be seen in its very title, "Above the Earth and On the Earth," and by its last line, which is "Hail to the Sputnik! Down with the sputniki [companions; a play on words] of our life -- the ever increasing shortages!"

6. News Item on Tibet; News Desk, 13 October 1957.

We agree that it would be desirable to identify the Chinese Communist government and state as such in RL programs. However, to say this is not to agree with the implication in Mr. Levine's comments that the Soviet audience is unaware that the "Chinese People's Republic" is Communist China; nor with his contention that the conversion of Tibet into a province of Red China "is masked by a reference to the CPR." On the contrary, it is fair to assume that the Soviet audience is aware, if only through official Soviet media references to the "fulfillment of the Tibetan people's age-old longing" to be incorporated into China, that the Chinese took it over in 1951. Similarly, it may be assumed that the Soviet audience would know that where Party-government workers and military forces of the Chinese government (the Communist nature of which, again, is no secret to the Soviet people) are assigned, there the local government is under Communist control. No support is found for the label "ambiguous" which Mr. Levine pins to the words of the news dispatch that "the Chinese military command has warned the (Tibetan) people that, in the event of a repetition of uprisings such as occurred last year, it will know how to deal with the insurgents."

Further, to attribute to a Soviet audience ignorance of the full implications of "social reforms" and of "Chinese schools" in this context is to assume that the Soviet people are either hopelessly naive or indoctrinated to an extraordinary extent.

Finally, the kind of treatment of the Chicom-Tibet story which Mr. Levine appears to desire is most properly handled not in a spot news item but in a news analysis or special feature story.

7. Crossman Review of the Djilas Book; Russian Desk, 14 October 1957.

The truth of this matter -- the identification of the U.S. Government as the publisher of Djilas' book -- is that it was a misquotation. Mr. Crossman did not say in his Encounter review that the American Government published the Djilas book. His words were: "The American publishers compared Milovan Djilas with Karl Marx, and called his book the Anti-Communist Manifesto." (Underscoring under "publishers" added). It is, of course, inexcusable that the error was made and that it was not detected and corrected in the review of the script by an editorial supervisor before broadcast.

Unfortunate as this error was, it seems excessive to claim, however, that it "destroyed entirely the effectiveness of RL's transmission of the book." The authorship and contents of the book are, after all, much more important than the identity of its publishers -- we can recall that official U.S. publication of Khrushchev's "secret speech" hardly destroyed its effectiveness. Of course, the two cases are not identical, but the underlying principle is the same. The Soviet propaganda machine, fortunately, seems not to have picked up this error, as Mr. Levine was right to fear.

It may be added that the Crossman review itself, titled "Standing Marx on His Head" was most useful for RadLib purposes, attacking as the major weakness of the book Djilas' continued adherence to the Marxist dialectical orientation and historical determinism.

8. Weekly News Review on Sputnik; Frank, 14 October 1957.

This broadcast is a synthesis of the various comments on Sputnik made over the preceding week and it draws together in the sharpest terms the total approach which the Radio had consciously adopted on this question. It is in this review, then, that one can most clearly see RL's tactic of giving due recognition to the scientific achievement represented by Sputnik in order to smooth the way for critical evaluations of its larger significance.

It should be noted that Mr. Levine singled out for comment only the first part of this approach, omitting completely any mention of

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its second aspect. By this omission, the program's fulsome praise of the Soviet achievement naturally would be made to appear, at best gratuitous, at worst, what Mr. Levine implies as its motivation. As noted in another place, one may justifiably agree or disagree with the tactics adopted, one may have different evaluations of the skill with which these tactics have been implemented; however, one cannot justifiably fail to see and report that the radio is engaged here in a very deliberate attempt to extract an advantage from a basically disadvantageous situation.

Thus, we find that the program under discussion refers once again to the comments RI had cited on 9 October from the British and American press -- in each instance there is the praise, plus the sobering reservation.

As an interesting innovation, the program calls attention to Franco's remark that Sputnik proves the superiority of regimes like those in Spain and in the Soviet Union over democracies. The Soviet people could hardly fail to understand the significance of this "praise."

The program also reports Eisenhower's comments on Sputnik, and it reports further that Lodge proposed in the U.N. the conclusion of an agreement ensuring the utilization of space for peaceful purposes.

Concluding its comments on Sputnik with a report of U.S. initiative on space control gave added point to Bevan's quoted statement about the possibility that the Soviet Union may now be more conciliatory on the disarmament question. Mr. Levine objects to this Bevan quote, but it actually indicates that the Soviet Union had not been compromising in the past and tends to place the onus for future progress on disarmament on the Soviets.

Concerning Mr. Levine's accusation of "masking the horrors" of Communism under the phrase "shortcomings of the Soviet mechanism," it is recognized that a clearer and more forceful expression should have been used, but a full quotation from the script places in more rounded perspective what the program was trying to accomplish:

The success of this (Sputnik) experiment not only facilitates the task of Soviet propaganda, but it will also involuntarily compel the world to forget for a time [Note: Mr. Levine omitted 'for a time' from his translation] those shortcomings of the Soviet mechanism which have made one question all the achievements of the Communist regime. The launching of the artificial satellite will make one forget the anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution, the failure of the last Soviet Five-Year Plan, and many other things which must have alarmed the Soviet government in recent times.

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Not as trenchant as it might have been, but surely not a "mask" either.

9. News Item on Kadar Speech; News Desk, 14 October 1957.

This news item gave highlights from those portions of a speech by Kadar to a Party meeting in Budapest in which the Hungarian Communist leader warned Party members about the possibility of a popular demonstration on the impending first anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution. It was in this context, as the news item made clear, that Kadar made the observation which Mr. Levine criticizes the Radio for repeating without comment: "Kadar added, however, that the Party has gained from the fact that it now has ten times fewer members than before the uprising (underlined words omitted in Mr. Levine's quote of the passage) because the Party has got rid of the cowards."

In context it would be perfectly clear to the Soviet audience, without RL comment, that the "cowards" to whom Kadar referred are those members of the Hungarian Communist Party who either refrained from taking sides against the people during the Revolution or who joined them in revolution.

Equally superfluous would it have been for RL to identify Kadar as "the usurper of the Hungarian Government or the head of a dictatorship." Aside from the general objections against loading programs with unnecessary propagandistic epithets, RL has been, and precisely at this time was, replete with all kinds of stories about the Hungarian Revolution and its aftermath which clearly defined Kadar's position.

The words of the news item about Kadar's return from China do not support Mr. Levine's complaint that "a reference to his (Kadar's) return from China does not specify Red China":

"In the conclusion of his speech, Kadar, who had just returned from a trip to China, told the gathered Party activists that Hungary must be guided by the example of the Chinese road to Communism. Kadar acknowledged the poor living conditions of the inhabitants of Communist China, but emphasized the strength and the vigilance of the Chinese Communist Party and the state security organs."

10. News Item on E. German Students; News Desk, 25 October 1957.

This news dispatch went on to describe the hostile activity of the students: "According to the Communist press, this activity consisted

in tearing down from a number of buildings the Red flags which had been put up at the time of the May Day celebrations." This would seem to fulfill the requirements of a news item. The whole burden of the RL message is to lead the people to the belief, or to strengthen their already latent awareness, that hostility towards the Communist leadership is not only an act friendly to the West, as Mr. Levine would have it, but more important, a service to themselves.

11. News Items on Paris Strikes; News Desk, 26 October 1957.

A factual explanation or comment should have been added to this report on the Paris strikes, as well as to all similar news items. RL is remiss here.

Because of the implication of Mr. Levine's observation that RL newscasts "are quick to report strikes in the Western world," it should be pointed out that reporting of strikes in the West is, at the very least, a two-edged sword -- in addition to the edge referred to by Mr. Levine, strikes do show the rights and power of organized labor, which is certainly the main reason for their inclusion in RL programs. In this connection, it also should be pointed out that RL is even quicker to pick up all reports of labor and other manifestations of popular unrest and power in the Communist bloc.

If Mr. Levine's assertion is true, however, that RL's reports on strikes in the West are "usually made without comment," then this must be corrected, insofar as such background information would serve the purpose of stressing free labor's strength in order to overcome any possible implication in the news item of serious social turmoil in the West.

12. Dialogue on the 40th Anniversary; Russian Desk, 1 November 1957.

Mr. Levine's comments give an erroneous impression of the nature of this program.

This program was actually the first in a series of an invented dialogue between a (notional) Communist and an anti-Communist, in which the anti-Communist undertakes systematically to destroy the standard Communist justification for the Bolshevik Revolution.

In this first program the "Communist" opens the discussion with the assertion that the growth of Communism over the past 40 years is its own justification; the anti-Communist denies that "success" can be

used as a standard, observes that Napoleon and Hitler were "successful" in their day, and points out that the Communist story has not been ended yet. The two men then discuss the significance of the Communist Revolution in Russian for Marx' laws on social development. The anti-Communist shows that the fact of the Communist revolution in an industrially backward country, in contradiction to Marx' laws, is proof of the worthlessness of these laws. The final portion of the discussion deals with Lenin's promise that the Bolshevik Revolution would bring peace to Russia. The anti-Communist argues that Lenin had not only betrayed Russian and world democracy and Russian national interests by demoralizing Russian troops and by withdrawing Russia from the War, but that the Revolution had actually resulted in an additional four years of warfare for the Russian people.

Now, chastened by his "defeat" on the question of the first point ("peace") of Lenin's revolutionary program, the "Communist" speaks the words which alone are cited by Mr. Levine:

Let us assume that Lenin and the Bolshevik Party did not gauge accurately the time element. However, the most important thing is the fact that the Revolution, with its achievements and opportunities which it opened up to the people, was saved."

To which his opponent replies, concluding this first talk:

"These results of the Revolution, and particularly, the slogan, 'Land to the Peasants, Factories to the Workers,' are precisely what we will talk about the next time."

13. Feature on Zhukov's Dismissal; Kasantsev, 4 November 1957.

Mr. Levine's commentary is an excellent illustration of the ease with which innocent lines lifted out of context can be made to appear suspicious. Let the pertinent portion of the script speak for itself:

"October is the month of great historical anniversaries, and this year, of great historical events. October is the month of three revolutions, one of which, occurring in Russia 40 years ago, marked the beginning of a new epoch in the life of our country (Russia), and not only of our country, but, indirectly, in the life of all mankind. [Mr. Levine quotes only this sentence from the script]. Forty years ago saw the beginning of the realization of that social doctrine which previously had agitated

minds for decades. The specter of Communism, which had hung over Europe, finally had the opportunity to materialize.

Thirty-nine years later, also in October, the peoples of two countries of Eastern Europe -- Poland and Hungary -- initiated the beginning of the process which can be most precisely defined as the disintegration of Communism, as the forerunner of the end of the epoch which began 40 years ago. When, to the accompaniment of the ecstatic shouts of a crowd of many thousands of people, the statue of Stalin, loosened by a blow-torch, came crashing down on one of the streets of Budapest, the roar of the bronze statue hitting the asphalt announced the beginning of a new era -- and also not only in the life of the Hungarian people, but, indirectly, in the life of all mankind, and, one would like to believe, in the life of our own (Russian) people, above all."

It is worth adding that this program really concerned not the October Revolution, but Zhukov's downfall. The remarks were just a warm-up to the main subject. And, interestingly enough, while the propaganda purpose which the script's analysis of the Zhukov purge was intended to serve is basically sound, still the script can be criticized for the extremism of its language in "suggesting" that Soviet soldiers can decide the fate of Communism in the Soviet Union:

"The concern of the (Communist) Party and government for the Army' derives, above all, from the fact that this (army) youth has weapons in its hands and that this youth is the only force in the country which can, without any effort, without risk and without casualties put an end to Party rule at any time."

14. News Item on Bevan Zhukov Quote; Reference to Sputnik; 5 November 1957.

It is not made clear by Mr. Levine's comments, but Mr. Bevan was talking about the Zhukov dismissal, and he is quoted by RL as saying: "What is important is not the fact that he (Zhukov) was dismissed, but the manner in which he was dismissed: a considerable change for the better is noticeable in the Soviet Union compared to those days when undesirable leaders were liquidated after being subjected to political trials." Now, one of the things RL tried to do is to impress on the minds of the listener that changes for the better, which RL always ascribes to the power of the people, have occurred since Stalin's death in order to make any regression by the leadership more difficult

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and to stir the people to believe in their ability to force further changes. The Davan comment was presumably used for this reason, though, admittedly, its contribution is minimal.

Mr. Levine observes that "during the tense days of the Zhukov purge RI could not find a more optimistic note to strike for its audience! But it did find during the broadcast a new description for the Sputnik. On this day it referred to it as an 'almost incredible' achievement."

Here are some of the other contents of the 5 May broadcast:

News Items

Item on Lodge remarks in UN on the Hungarian Revolution.

Item reporting the death sentence of at least 2,000 participants in the Hungarian Revolution by secret tribunal.

Item on the protest of Norwegian writers to the Hungarian Government on the trial of four Hungarian writers.

Item on Richard Lowenthal's analysis of Zhukov's dismissal, which Lowenthal sees as a successful attempt by Khrushchev to set up the Party, with himself in command, as the only leading force in the country. But, the writer notes, in doing this Khrushchev paid the price of isolating the Party from the support of the Army.

Press Review: On Sputnik and Zhukov

London Times: Sputnik II shows that while the Soviet Union leads other countries in this field of science, the Zhukov case confirms the struggle for power, which is characteristic of tyrannies of the past.

London Daily Telegraph and Crankshaw: The Zhukov case is seen as a power struggle with inherent dangers for Khrushchev and rooted in the dictatorial Party-state system.

New York Herald-Tribune: It is not certain that the Soviet struggle for power will not lead to bloody purges like those of the 30's. In any case the West must remain strong and united to resist any aggression.

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Features

Second program in the Dialogue series -- the "communist" doesn't fare well here either.

Interview with Shann, Chairman of the UN Special Committee on Hungary. Shann explains how the Committee went about its work, comments on its findings, refutes some Communist charges.

15. "Forty Years Ago--the October Revolution," Variety Show, NYFD, 10 November 1957.

Mr. Levine correctly observes that this is a very long script -- 12 pages running to over 22 minutes of broadcast time. Yet, Mr. Levine condemns only a single line of script, saying nothing about the remainder.

After going into great detail on events in Russia from March to November 1917, in which Lenin is represented as a traitor to Russian national interests and Russian democracy, using German-supplied money to undermine both the Russian army and the Russian democratic government, the program recalls for its Soviet listeners the dire prophecies of Plekhanov, founder of Russian Marxism, and of Maxim Gorky concerning the consequences of the Bolshevik Revolution.

The broadcast quotes the following from Gorky's article in his newspaper on November 17, 1917, ten days after the Revolution:

"Lenin, Trotsky and their associates have already been corrupted by the foul poison of power. This is evidenced by their disgraceful attitude towards freedom of speech, of the individual and towards the whole compass of those rights for the victory of which democracy has fought.

The working class cannot help but understand that, with its skin, with its blood, Lenin is carrying out only a kind of experiment, that he is trying to lead the revolutionary inclination of the proletariat to its final extreme and to see what the outcome will be.

Of course, he doesn't believe in the possibility of the victory of the proletariat in Russia under present conditions, but, perhaps, he is counting on a miracle.

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"The working class must know that there are no miracles in real life, that what is in store for it is hunger, complete disorganization of industry, the collapse of transportation, prolonged bloody anarchy, and after that -- no less bloody, black reaction."

The program continues and concludes (the only line which Mr. Levine extracted from this script is underlined):

"This is what Maxim Gorky wrote in the paper 'New Life' on 17 November 1917. Forty years have passed since then. During those 40 years our country has known both hunger and bloody anarchy, and black reaction. At this high price has there been created in our country an advanced industry whose achievements sometimes astonish the imagination of the whole world. But Gorky's main fear was realized: the nature of the Communist dictatorship, which began, in the words of Gorky, with 'a disgraceful attitude towards freedom of speech, of the individual,' has not changed over 40 years."

Mr. Levine's comment was: "Could Khrushchev ask for more in justifying the Stalin era?" The script itself, read in context, furnishes a positively affirmative answer.

What Khrushchev asks, as the program suggests, is to persuade the Soviet and other people that dramatic technological and industrial achievements, like Sputnik II, launched a few days before this program, are sufficient justification for the horrors of Communism. It would seem to be sound propaganda tactics not only not to deny such an achievement as Sputnik represents, but to admit it openly, the better to fight against Communism's only talking point.

16. Report on Interview with Fast; News Feature, News Desk, 12 November 1957.

Contrary to Mr. Levine's assertion that RL "introduced" the Fast interview with the information that Fast had been imprisoned in the U.S. for contempt of Congress, the program begins simply by informing the listeners that Fast had given a press conference to inform American reporters about the contents of his book The Naked God, in which he explains his reasons for breaking with the Communist Party. Continuing, RL reports that: "In his interview, Fast gave a detailed analysis of the current position of Communist Parties in the West and pointed out the reasons for the catastrophic decline of their influence on public opinion in the free countries."

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A report of the contents of the Fast interview follows, with Fast making the following points:

- Khrushchev's attempts to explain Stalin's errors and crimes by the "cult of the individual" is an act of "idiocy" -- the Stalinist regime was the result of "the very essence of one-party communist rule."
- Khrushchev had taken no measures to change the system responsible for Stalinism.
- Lenin understood that the professional communist revolutionary would, after the seizure of power, degenerate into a Party bureaucrat.
- Communism in practice denies any kind of equality; a Communist Party in power "everywhere leads to unprecedented tyranny, and excludes any possibility of equality."
- When a Communist Party attains power it imprisons its opponents, executes them and subjects the human personality to all kinds of degradation.
- Fast couldn't remain a communist after he read Khrushchev's directives to writers.

It is at this point, near the end of the program, that the passage criticized by Mr. Levine occurs. And it was included obviously for the same reason that Mr. Fast referred to it. (The single sentence Mr. Levine cited is underlined):

"In 1950 he (Fast) even had to undergo a short jail sentence for refusing to give a Commission of the American Congress testimony concerning the activity of the Communist organization, of which he was a member. However, Fast writes (in his book), in spite of all this, no one tried to prevent him from writing and publishing his works, or to destroy him as a writer.

"In the Soviet Union and in other communist countries," Fast writes, "writers were physically liquidated in Stalin's days, as Khrushchev himself has told us, and were subjected first to spiritual and physical torture.

Howard Fast writes that cruelty and crimes have always taken place in human history. However, never before has a single society resorted to methods of destruction of those holding divergent views on such a gigantic scale as has Soviet rule. If, in bourgeois

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societies, the death penalty is meted out on rare occasions for especially heinous crimes, in the Soviet Union and in other communist countries the death penalty for many long years has been a massive weapon of the policy of the ruling class.

"Howard Fast concluded his interview with the declaration that the amoral slogan which Lenin enunciated for the first time, that 'everything is moral which is useful for the Revolution, while everything which harms it is immoral,' is a primitive conception, unworthy of civilized man."

17. News Item on Zapotocky Death; News Desk, 13 November 1957.

This superficial biographical sketch is a waste of time. We cannot agree with Mr. Levine that this biographic treatment is "worthy in every respect of an official Soviet obituary;" however, while it lacks all the typical embellishments of an official Soviet obituary, it contains none of the embellishments which RL should provide. A biography in depth should not be carried in the "News of the Day" section, but, rather in a news note or special feature.

18. News Item on Mohammed-Dulles Talks; News Desk, 29 November 1957.

To be precise, this news item is not simply a dispatch on Mohammed's visit to the U.S., but a report, as indicated, of the "joint communique published on conclusion of talks by the Moroccan King Mohammed with Secretary of State Dulles."

The news item, then, was a report of the communique, of which the question of U.S. bases was the last point (it would have been clearer that the official communique was involved if Mr. Levine had reproduced the initial word of the phrase he cited, which was, "Moreover, the American and Moroccan Governments, etc.")

It is not believed that Mr. Levine would suggest that RL could afford to suppress this last point of an official communique; particularly in view of the consideration, which he himself points out, that the Soviet public would certainly be informed by Soviet media of this point in the agreement. The justification for U.S. bases -- and of the West's defensive alliances -- is a subject which RL deals with on a routine basis in a variety of forms.

19. News Feature

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19. News Feature on Denial of Visa for Chess Champ Bronstein; News Desk, 29 November 1957.

This news feature commented on the refusal of the U.S. Department of State to grant a visa for the Soviet chess champion to take part in the international chess contest in Texas. It pointed out that the lateness of the visa application was the basis for State's action and noted that the Soviet government probably deliberately delayed the application in order to embarrass the U.S. and make propaganda hay out of it.

The radio's own evaluation of the event is as given by Mr. Levine. The reason for its comment may be inferred from the very fact that the broadcast explicitly stated that "it is the opinion of Radio Liberation that this action of the American State Department can be described not only as erroneous but also stupid." Rather than constituting "an attempt to draw a line between the Government and people of the U.S.," as Mr. Levine charges, this line would actually seem to be an attempt at a "Declaration of Independence" of the radio, for the benefit of Soviet listeners; an attempt through this outspoken criticism of State Department action to convince its listeners in a dramatic fashion that the radio is truly independent of U.S. control. The radio people probably thought that it was safe to issue its "Declaration of Independence" on a matter not involving basic U.S. policy, and that it was wise, from a propaganda point of view, to agree with what they considered would be the conviction of its listeners.

While we would not see any objection to the radio's expressing its disagreement on occasion with a particular action of the State Department, and would even consider it tactically wise, still the language used in this broadcast is unnecessarily sharp.

20. Weekly News Review on Euratom; News Desk, 2 December 1957.

The pertinent portion of the weekly news review program was, with the exception of the line quoted by Mr. Levine on Euratom, an analysis of the significance of European economic unification -- with its point of departure the ratification of the Common Market and Euratom by the last of the participating governments, Luxembourg. The entire emphasis of this review was on the economic prosperity that the Common Market will bring to the free countries concerned and to their peoples.

It was in this context that the remark about Euratom was made: "As for the Euratom agreement, it will lead in the future to Western Europe's becoming a fully independent industrial giant, along with the

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two atomic giants -- the Soviet Union and the U.S.A.

The line in this broadcast is not an emphasis on the atomic industrial might of the Soviet Union, but on the prospects of a flourishing Western Europe -- a line very different from the official Soviet line on the European unification movements. It is doubtful that RL enhanced the morale of Soviet listeners by a casual reference to Soviet atomic might, of which they are probably quite aware.

21. Two News Items on China; News Desk, 3 December 1957.

As indicated above in our remarks on the 13 October news item concerning Tibet, it would be desirable for the radio to adopt a consistent practice of identifying the Chicom Government and state as such.

Concerning the news report of the Chicom-Danish trade agreement, this would be a logical contribution to the general endeavor to arouse anxiety about the long-range economic (in this case) and political competition with Russia of a China, to whose growth the Soviet Government is contributing so significantly.

22. News Item on Report of the President's Committee on Science and Technology; News Desk, 3 December 1957.

All items carried by the radio during this time on the status of U.S. science and technology cannot be considered out of the context of the repercussions produced in the U.S. -- among public figures, special committees, in the press -- in the wake of Sputniks I and II. One cannot forego the many, often hysterically, gloomy prognostications for America's and the Free World's future which resounded so loudly here and abroad, and which, of course, were eagerly picked up in the Soviet press.

RL, in such circumstances, was faced with a dual necessity: (1) to report to some extent the wave of breast-beating surging over the U.S. in order not to give the listeners cause for believing it suppressed news unfavorable to the U.S., of which they were perfectly aware, and (2) at the same time to try to put this U.S. self-criticism into due perspective, to emphasize those aspects of U.S. self-revelations suppressed or minimized by Soviet propaganda, and to extract as much as possible from this self-criticism which could show the material and spiritual advantages of a free society over a totalitarian one.

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This is what the Radio tried to do. Individuals may differ over the precise handling of one or another item, over the relative proportions of admission of U.S. vulnerabilities and demonstration of U.S. strength. But, this is again a matter of judgment, not of sinister intent.

Thus, the 3 December news item which reported the finding of the President's Special Committee that Soviet science will overtake American science in from five to ten years unless timely steps are taken to apply greater effort to develop American science, had the merit of pointing out that Soviet science at present lags behind U.S. science, refuting the claim of Soviet propaganda that the Soviets had already overtaken the U.S.

23. News Commentary on Foreign Trip of Polish Citizens; News Desk, 4 December 1957.

This news commentary was obviously, almost explicitly, designed to stimulate and increase existing dissatisfaction among Soviet citizens with their inability to travel abroad. The program, which gave interesting data on the relative freedom of travel of citizens in another communist country and on the various expedients resorted to by Polish youth to travel in spite of restrictions on currency which could be taken out of the country, fulfilled its purpose well.

To think that this program could have undertaken to induce defections at the same time is utterly unrealistic. However, the remark about the small percentage of defectors among the tourists, which was undoubtedly inserted to undermine the implicit Soviet "justification" for prohibiting freedom of travel to its citizens, can be viewed as a subtle two-edged sword. After all, one per cent of a total of 280,000 is not an inconsiderable number of defectors.

As for Mr. Levine's comment on the prohibitive increase in passport fees -- while it is true that approximately six weeks after the broadcast the fees were increased to a prohibitive level of more than ten times the original charge, nevertheless, approximately five weeks before Mr. Levine's written comment, the fee was drastically reduced -- to a level less than double the original charge. If the memory of this reviewer serves him well, RL used this reversal well, as an object lesson for its listeners, interpreting it as a concession to pressure of public opinion.

24. News Item

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24. News Item on Congressman Cellar's Statement to Press; News Desk, 5 December 1957.

This item certainly transgresses the legitimate bounds to which the radio may go in attempting to prove itself independent of U.S. control. Extremely poor judgment was used in selecting this item as a news report. The false identification of Cellar as a Republican was the final inept touch to a totally misguided effort.

25. News Item on Soviet Icebreaker; News Desk, 6 December 1957.

The only purpose served by this report of the launching of the world's first atomic icebreaker by the Soviets is a legitimate one -- to defend the radio against charges of suppression of important news items, even though they may be favorable to the Soviet Union. The radio did not, of course, inform Soviet listeners of anything they didn't know, but it did add, as an obvious counter-balance, the commentary that:

As is known, the United States has three atomic-powered submarines -- the 'Nautilus,' 'Sea Wolf' and 'Skate.'

26. Quotation from Editorial in Stockholm Tidningen; 6 December 1957.

Unfortunately, the reviewer cannot find this quote on the greater adherence of the Khrushchev regime than of Stalin's to the rule of law. He will, therefore, confine his remarks simply to the (repeated) observation that it is one of the aims of the radio to encourage the Soviet people to believe in their ability to influence Soviet policy in the direction of greater and greater relaxation, to overcome their feeling of resignation before their seeming helplessness to change the nature of the regime, a feeling which itself helps to render ineffectual the force of public opinion on the Communist leadership.

27. Feature Commentary on the New Socialism; Frank, 6 December 1957.

This broadcast is an attempt to combat reactionary communism with democratic socialism, to exploit communist falsification of conditions in the West -- in short to exploit the revisionist ferment in the communist world. Starting with a reference to the distorted reporting of the Pravda correspondent on the Austrian Socialist Congress and pointing out the admission in the Communist Declaration of November

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of improved conditions for workers in the West, the broadcast proceeds to show how the Austrian Socialist Party's new program is responsive to the political and economic reality in the West of the 20th century, in contrast to reactionary and unrealistic Communism.

Mr. Levine's comment is justified to the extent that this broadcast referred to, but didn't indicate, the nature of the 'new roads' opened by the Austrian Socialist Party -- these democratic socialist roads are not 'new,' and the Austrian Socialist program is not laid on in detail. The point is, however, that enough information is given for the Soviet listener to understand the basic divergence between the Communist and the democratic socialist roads.

Quoting from the introduction to the Austrian Socialist draft program, the announcer reads:

'Socialism is that social order whose aim is the free unfolding of the human individual. The prerequisites of this order are: the freedom of the person and of peoples, freedom of religion and conscience, economic independence of the individual man, social equality of classes, and confidence in tomorrow. The path to this goal is political democracy.'

It is in obvious reference to these principles that the RL speaker goes on to make the assertion referred to by Mr. Levine, the full passage being:

For, as Winston Churchill, one of the most convinced opponents of socialism of the Stalinist type, once said, 'We are all socialists now;' that is, all of us, regardless of our personal convictions, live in a period when some basic moral principles of socialism have become part of our flesh and blood. (Mr. Levine quoted and commented only on the underlined portion.)

The mistake made by the author of this program was in identifying RL too closely with democratic socialism. This occurred through the style of presentation -- the RL representative to the Austrian Socialist Congress speaking in a conversational, familiar tone to the Soviet audience, refuting the report of the Pravda representative to the Congress and giving the Soviet people the true story. While this approach had the advantage of making a program on theoretical matters more vivid than a straight account, insufficient care was taken to assure that the radio itself was not associated with Social Democracy.

28. News Commentary on U.S. Reappraisal of Education and Scientific Research; New York Program Department, 8 December 1957.

Bearing in mind the points made above about the widely publicized reappraisal in the

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reappraisal in the U.S. of its way of life in response to the Soviet sputniks, and the one-sided report of it in the Soviet press, this commentary seems to be a very skillful presentation, in the guise of objective reporting of the American debate, of the high American standard of living and of the meaning of a democratic society. Let the full script speak for itself:

In recent times there has begun in America a broad discussion reevaluating the (American) way of life. In the press and in pronouncements of public figures the question is increasingly asked: Is all well in our life? The impetus for the discussion is the latest achievements of Soviet science. Therefore, the discussions have primarily turned around the state of education and strictly scientific research work in America. It suffices to say that last year Americans spent 15 billion dollars on tobacco and alcoholic beverages, and on education, 15½ billions. Americans spend on themselves twice as much as the inhabitant of the wealthiest European country. Sixty percent of (American) families live in their own houses; three out of every four families own automobiles. Eighty percent of American households own television sets; 96% -- refrigerators.

In 1956, 42 billions were spent in America on defense, 72 billions on food, and 25 billions on clothing.

Thirty-five billions were spent last year on all industrial construction, and on housing -- 48 billions. For furniture and house furnishings alone Americans spent 40 billion dollars last year, on automobiles and car maintenance -- 27 billions.

On scientific research, excluding research on atomic energy and defense, of course, 500 million dollars were spent last year, while 800 millions were spent on flowers and gardening.

For foreign travel alone Americans spent 1½ billions last year.

The place occupied by purely scientific research work in America can be inferred from the following fact: 250 million dollars were spent on developing a new model of the Ford automobile, while only 110 millions were spent on developing American plans for an artificial earth satellite.

What is the meaning of these facts and figures? First of all, they attest to the extraordinarily high standard of living of the individual American. But, education and purely scientific research work occupies a relatively small place in America. Of course, this does not mean that America does not have good universities and schools, that it does not have leading scientists and researchers. But, the pay of an American teacher and average scientific worker is less than the

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pay of an average worker; the salary of a professor or scientific-research worker is considerably less than the income of a lawyer, businessman, or advertising specialist. It is not surprising that the most capable youth enters the commercial field or industry producing, for example, nylon or television sets.

Do the American Government and Congress understand the possible consequence of this situation? Yes, they understand. But state power in the U.S. depends on the voters; therefore, neither the government nor Congress can, without the approval of voters, force them to spend more on education than they spend on automobiles, for example. But the American people, in the light of present-day scientific advances in the world, especially our scientific advances, are beginning to understand that man does not live by cake alone. Precisely for this reason the American press and the American public have begun talking about the necessity for evaluating their way of life. A widespread discussion is being carried out all over America, which testifies to the fact that the Americans are realizing that, for all of their wealth and freedoms, they have inexcusably neglected questions of education, science and other spiritual values. Many Americans, looking life squarely in the eye, concealing nothing, are calling upon the people to reexamine their views and habits.

We do not know how this American discussion will end, but the very fact of an open, often merciless, self-criticism is an undoubtedly healthy manifestation.

Unless a people, every people, including our own, have the possibility of making a systematic reevaluation of their values, a viable society and progress are impossible."

Now, all this undoubtedly sounds very different to a Soviet audience than to an American one -- just the reverse, we could say. For, just as, in the context of Sputnik, we have been looking on American material achievements and the democratic process as "shortcomings," for the Soviets these "shortcomings" are precisely what they would like to have a little of.

Finally, the identification of RL with Soviet scientific achievements is consistent with the radio's image as the voice of fellow-countrymen of the Soviet peoples, proud of their achievements, which are always interpreted as the result of the people's native genius, never as the result of Communist leadership.

29. Biog. Sketch of George Kennan; Russian Desk, 9 December 1957.

Mr. Levine addresses his criticism primarily to the content and length of the biographical sketch broadcast on George Kennan, but he

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raises a much larger issue by referring indirectly to RL's extensive treatment of Kennan's whole series of six Reith lectures which the biographical material introduced. Mr. Levine states in his formal comment that RL broadcast (in installments) the full texts of the entire series. He reiterated this in a later informal memorandum. A report from RL New York headquarters, however, disputes this. It says that while the first two lectures were presented verbatim, the remaining four were abridged and/or paraphrased. Moreover, during the serialization of these lectures, RL interpolated: (a) disclaimer that Kennan's views reflected those of the radio station, and (b) former Secretary of State Acheson's repudiation of Kennan's views and the published statement of a well-known writer in a British weekly taking issue with his conclusions.

In spite of these qualifications, however, and bearing in mind that the serialization of the lectures was preceded by news coverage, the New York report indicates that RL gave far more attention to the Kennan lectures than they deserved, from the standpoint of quantity alone. In the absence of a comparison of the texts of the RL broadcasts with those of the lectures themselves, an analysis of the scripts' substantive content cannot be made at this time.

Here is the RL sequence of activity on the Kennan lectures, according to the New York record:

Kennan delivered his first lecture on 10 November 1957. Beginning with 12 November, RL reported on each of the first four lectures in its daily newscasts. The last two lectures were not covered in newscasts.

On 4 December, RL, Munich, requested New York guidance on the advisability of including Kennan's proposal for withdrawal of all troops from Central Europe as part of its proposed series of special programs on the lectures. It also requested New York's views of Kennan's analysis of the Soviet internal situation.

On 10 December, New York replied with the suggestion that RL should not over-emphasize Kennan's views, in order to avoid the appearance that RL was involved in an essentially American debate, and that the controversial nature of his views should be stressed. New York followed this message on 11 December with a recommendation that RL use extensive quotes from the first two lectures insofar as they touched upon his analysis of the internal Soviet picture and the psychological contradictions among the leadership, but less verbatim use of his advice to the West. It also was recommended that the third and fourth lectures be handled with "circumspection," presenting only enough to give the essence of Kennan's position plus a balanced picture of world-wide

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reactions with emphasis on those from West Germany. It also was recommended that RL itself should not comment on the lectures.

On 13 December, Munich advised New York that it would treat the lectures "along the lines suggested."

After broadcasting the biographical profile of Kennan on 9 December, RL inaugurated a special serialization of the lectures in 15 installments beginning with 11 December and ending with 24 January. This schedule was as follows:

Lecture No. 1 - The Internal Soviet Scene: Three installments, 11, 13, 16 December; (verbatim).

Lecture No. 2 - The Soviet Mind and World Realities: Three installments, 18, 19, 23 December; (verbatim).

Lecture No. 3 - The Problem of Eastern and Western Europe: Three installments, 6, 8, 10 January; (abridged). At the conclusion of the second installment, RL stated that it was presenting the talks because of the interest and public debate they had aroused, and that the lectures did not reflect the views of RL. At the conclusion of the third installment, virtually the complete text of Salvador de Madariaga's article in Time and Tide of 14 December taking issue with Kennan on his proposed solution for the reunification of Germany was broadcast.

Lecture No. 4 - "The Military Problem": Two installments, 13, 15 January; (abridged and paraphrased). At the conclusion of the last installment, two paragraphs of Acheson's statement countering Kennan's conclusions, in addition to the former Secretary of State's assertion that Kennan's views did not reflect those of the Democratic party, were broadcast. Immediately following this, excerpts from the Madariaga article were repeated.

Lecture No. 5 - Russia and the non-European World: Three installments, 17, 21, 23 January (abridged and paraphrased).

Lecture No. 6 - "Strengthening of NATO: To What End?": One installment, 24 January (condensed).

The New York report concluded:

The Kennan lectures were presented over RL in order to demonstrate that in Western democracies it is possible to express views dissenting from those of one's own government, unlike the situation in the Soviet Union.

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As to the points in the Kennan biography which Mr. Levine criticized, the completion of the sentence he cited casts a different light on his interpretation. The original line reads as follows:

The Soviet Union liberated Eastern Europe from Hitler
[Mr. Levine stops here] only in order to lay its hands on
it and to start foisting Communism forcibly (on it).

Kennan's criticism of excessive U.S. devotion to principles in foreign affairs is Kennan's views, not RL's. Needless to say, however, devotion to principles is one charge the Communists have not hurled against U.S. policy and will, in this sense, be a novelty for the Soviet audience.

Again, Kennan's skepticism with a policy of liberation is presented as his own, not the radio's, views. And it would be difficult to imagine that it occurred to the Soviet listener that Radio Liberation itself does not believe in a policy of liberation. On the other hand, it may have occurred to the Soviet audience that the radio is not afraid of presenting honest views different from its own.

30. Talk With an English Student (Features); Russian Desk, 9 December 1957.

Mr. Levine states that the quotations he has selected from this interview "prove enlightening" about the real reason for RL's choosing to interview the head of Cambridge University's student Labor Club, rather than of the Liberal or Conservative clubs. In actuality, most of the quotations selected by Mr. Levine are only the "set-up" for the real reason the head of the Labor Club was interviewed. Before we present, not the other side of the picture, but an intrinsic part of that picture, without which one can get only a misleading conception of the broadcast, it should be pointed out that Mr. Levine obtained his figures on membership in the Liberal and Conservative clubs from the interview itself, given in response to a direct request for these figures by the RL correspondent. Needless to say, if Mr. Levine's insinuations were correct, the RL correspondent wouldn't have inquired about membership in the other clubs, or this information would have been suppressed after it was determined that the other clubs had considerably more members than the Labor Club, the small number of which the RL correspondent furthermore emphasized by pointing out that it came to "less than 5%" of the student body.

By establishing in the interview that the Labor Club is socialist in economic orientation and that some of its foreign policy aims even coincide with announced Soviet foreign policy aims, the program enlists

the sympathetic

the sympathetic interest in the interviewee of the large number of Soviet listeners whose views are the same; all the greater may be the effect on them of the following words of the head of the Labor Club.

1) On Socialist Political Democracy and the Soviet Union:

Correspondent: What do you mean by social-democratic ideas?

Pratley: We want to introduce socialism into England, but we're convinced that socialism cannot be introduced by force. [Mr. Levine cites these lines but doesn't include the following exchange, and doesn't make it clear that these questions and answers were given separate emphasis, outside of Pratley's enumeration of the reasons he became a Laborite.]

Corr: In what way then?

Prat: Gradually and in a democratic manner.

After Pratley speaks about various points in Labor's domestic and foreign program, the following exchange takes place:

Corr: Tell me, please, since you've begun talking about Labor's foreign policy principles or tasks, what is your organization's attitude toward the Soviet Union.

Prat: We respect the achievements of the Soviet Union, but we regret that these achievements were bought at the expense of such privations for the Soviet people. [Mr. Levine produced only this much of this exchange]. We are positively unable to agree that a single-party system in a country is right.

Corr: Well then, would you personally remain in this party if it should become the only political party in England?

Prat: I would immediately leave the Labor Party."

2) On Free Speech and Discussion among British youth (which immediately follows the above passage):

Corr: Tell me, please, what does your student Labor

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Society in Cambridge do to carry out the aims you have just outlined?

Prat: Our society holds two meetings a week, at which we either listen to the speech of an invited guest, like, for instance, a member of Parliament, a trade unionist, writer or expert in some field or other; or we discuss political problems in other political societies, that is, with the Liberals or with the Conservatives; or we discuss political problems of the students from Asia or Africa, of whom there are many in Cambridge."

[And it is in the context of this free discussion that the following takes place]

Corr: Tell me, please, do you discuss certain problems with Communists inside your Club? Do Commies come to your meetings?

Prat: Yes, we treat the Commies courteously enough; they can come to our meetings, they can ask questions, etc.; they can discuss problems with us." [Apparently the text stops here, though it's conceivable that it continues as follows -- "but they can't vote in our elections for our resolutions."]

3) On Communists in Cambridge:

[The above exchange is immediately followed by information which should be most revealing to the Soviet audience]:

Corr: Are many students in your university Communists?

Prat: No, there are only 12 Communists in Cambridge University."

4) On relations between the Labor Youth and Labor Party -- another topic of interest to Komsomol-oriented Communist society:

Corr: Tell us, please, does your society follow the general policy of the Labor Party; does the Executive Committee (of the Labor Party) instruct you on what you must do and how you must think?

Prat: No, we follow the policy of the Party, but we often disagree with the policy of the Party and we often send critical resolutions to the Party's Executive Committee."

Corr: Tell us,

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Corr: Tell us, please, where does your society get its money. Does the central Labor organization subsidize your Society?

Prat: No, we don't receive anything from the Labor Party. Our members pay small dues."

5) On Soviet Distrust of its own youth. The interview closes with this interesting exchange:

Corr: Please answer the following question: Recently a delegation of Soviet students -- it seems there were eleven of them -- visited Cambridge and they spent, according to my information, 6 days in this University. Were you able to establish contact with them?"

Prat: No. Our Society invited them to come to a meeting, but, for some reason or other, they were unable to accept our invitation.

Corr: Were you sorry?

Prat: Yes, we were very, very sorry."

A final point. This interview was introduced with an explanation of why Pratley in particular was interviewed. It is explained by saying that the RL correspondent decided to interview Pratley upon learning that he, the present head of the student Labor Society was a student of the Russian language, and the interview was duly conducted in Russian. Now, even though this may have been simply a convenient reason to give for interviewing Pratley, the point is that this was the reason given -- and it certainly dissociated the radio from the program of the Labor Youth and Party.

31. News item on N.Y. strike; News Desk, 13 December 1957.

The general question of RL reporting on strikes in the West has already been discussed above. As far as RL news reporting on this particular strike is concerned, it should be pointed out, first, that the 13 December item was the first RL announcement of the strike, although it had been on for three days already. This hardly supports Mr. Levine's earlier charge that the radio "is quick" to report strikes in the West -- Moscow had ample time to inform its people in its own way of the N.Y. situation.

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The second announcement, as Mr. Levine reports, came on the 17th -- four days later. The third RL item, to which Mr. Levine made no reference, reported on the 18th the conclusion of the strike, which had ended only the previous evening. This fact might be used to support a claim that RL "is quick" to report the conclusion of strikes in the West.

Mr. Levine's objection to the reference in the second broadcast to a "catastrophic situation" is a valid one and that phraseology should have been omitted or toned down.

However, the last news report, on 18 December, to which Mr. Levine makes no reference, treats the conclusion of the strike as a clear victory for organized labor -- a real object lesson for Soviet labor:

"Last night, employees of the N.Y. subways adopted a resolution to cease the strike which had lasted 8 days.

"The strike began when 4 of its organizers were sentenced to a 2-week jail sentence for violating the decision of a civil court forbidding a strike at the present moment. [Surely the Soviet audience will not consider this jail sentence excessive!]

The question of concluding the strike was decided through voting at a general meeting of the subway employees, after they were promised that their 4 colleagues would be immediately released from prison. In addition, the subway workers were promised that all individuals who had taken part in the strike would get their jobs back again and, also, that a special fund would be set up to adjust the wage scales.

"As is known, the length of the N.Y. subway lines comes to 366 kilometers. The subway unites all areas of the tremendous city with its commercial center."

32. Weekly Commentary on NATO Conference; NYFD, 15 December 1957.

As Mr. Levine notes, in the light of the outcome of the NATO Conference, RL's announced expectation that NATO would be broadened into a political-economic union was quite unwise. RL unnecessarily and inexcusably went far out on a limb. The radio obviously was misled by the numerous reports in the West and by the suggestions of the Western leaders themselves that this move was in the offing, but it nevertheless, should have confined itself to straight reporting.

The "crisis of

The "crisis of NATO" was, of course, the burning topic in the West, and Soviet media had a field day with it. RL's references to it gave the Soviets nothing they didn't have. The context into which RL placed this crisis, and the hoped-for resolution of this crisis, was, needless to say, quite different from that of the Soviets. In short, for RL, as well as for the West, the crisis was the weakening of NATO's ability to combat the Soviet menace, and, conversely, the need to strengthen NATO was the need to strengthen NATO's ability to meet this challenge.

Thus, the news commentary under discussion states:

"It is not accidental that the Prime Minister of England, MacMillan, after his meeting with the President of the United States, declared in the House of Commons that, in light of the new developments, all member countries of NATO must make further concessions in the direction of limiting their sovereignty in the interest of collective security. It is also a well-known fact that MacMillan and Eisenhower, as well as the Foreign Minister of West Germany, Brentano, agreed that the military-defense alliance of NATO must be supplemented by unifying the scientific-research work of the members of the Alliance.

The government of the U.S. brought to Paris its own plan for strengthening the shaken unity of NATO. This plan anticipates the establishment of closer cooperation between NATO, SEATO - the alliance of Southeast Asian states - and also the Baghdad Pact alliance."

This commentary had been preceded in the program by several news items and by a report from RL's Paris correspondent. The following quotes from these items will underscore RL's consistent support of the West's lines on NATO:

News Items

"Paris: In his speech upon arrival at Orly Airport in Paris, President Eisenhower expressed his confidence that the Atlantic Union would be a still stronger weapon for peace after the scheduled three-day conference of other government heads.

Eisenhower announced:

'We will strive not only for the strengthening of our defensive shield - the NATO Atlantic alliance, but we shall work on the further unification of our efforts in other areas of our joint defense activities.'

The President expressed the hope that the strengthening of the military-political cooperation among the Western allies would

help create

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help create conditions for more peace-loving relations with the Soviet Union."

(Reporting Eisenhower's arrival in France, RL news quoted the following from Gaillard's welcoming speech) "I am happy to meet you on the land which you liberated as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. Your presence here emphasizes, one might say, the importance you attach to the future of our Alliance. Both our peoples have one and the same culture, and they are threatened by one and the same danger. That is why the French people greet your arrival in Paris with such joy."

The orientation of the report of RL's Paris correspondent is contained in the following statements:

"On the eve of these meetings, the French, and not only the French, press repeats a single thought: the impending contacts in Paris must determine the paths along which the united Atlantic states must direct their efforts for the active defense of the Western world from the dangers menacing it. The task of the participants in the NATO Conference consists in unifying atomic and hydrogen armaments; that is, eliminating the prevailing conditions under which only the U.S. and, to an extent, England, dispose of all types of atomic arms. The question now concerns the complete reorganization of military equipment and production -- more precisely, of the complete rationalization of production sites for all kinds of arms in one country; a system of division of labor among the participants of the Atlantic Alliance. This also means that there can be no military secrets among members of the defense alliance."

Contrary to Mr. Levine's expressed view, RL did not take "a position for the abolition of NATO as a military alliance in favor of 'a political-economic union.'" It did not suggest the abolition of the NATO military alliance. It did, quite improperly, align itself, before the results of the Conference were known, with widespread Western expectations that NATO would be broadened to include a political-economic as well as a military alliance.

Lastly, one can see that Lippmann was not the only Western public figure quoted in these broadcasts.

33. News Item on International Physicists' Congress in Stanford, Statement of Dr. Bethe; News Desk, 18 December 1957.

Little support can be found for Mr. Levine's contention that RL did the U.S. a disservice by citing Dr. Bethe's admission that the Soviet

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Union leads all other countries in rocket technique, because Dr. Bethe's admission was coupled with his statement that: "However, in the field of nuclear physics the S.U. still lags behind the U.S. and Britain." The latter was information which Soviet media normally would suppress.

This news item concluded with references to Dr. Colgate's report on the achievements of British scientists with hydrogen nuclear energy, but Mr. Levine's criticism did not mention this.

34. News item on Forecasts of Science in the 21st Century by Soviet scientists; News Desk, 21 December 1957.

This news item, citing the forecasts by Soviet scientists of 21st century science as printed in a Soviet organ, is obviously a "filler," an innocuous report which was carried for the pure interest value of future predicted science miracles. The Soviet scientists did not attribute future wonders to Soviet science, but to science in general, which, in a way, supports RL's attempts to show the community of interest of all scientists in the service of man. Quoting from an official Soviet propaganda organ is, contrary to Mr. Levine's assertion, no "innovation." It is done all the time for purposes of attribution and/or refutation. Here refutation is irrelevant.

35. Biography of Three New CPSU Central Committee Secretaries; Kulbitsky, 21 December 1957.

The apparent purpose this biographical sketch of the three newest secretaries of the Soviet Central Committee served in demonstrating to the Soviet audience RL's familiarity with domestic Soviet events is insufficient to justify a perfectly straight treatment. The same purpose could have been served with a revealing and thought-provoking analysis of the actual work of these men in one or another of their official posts. Since this program was a special feature, such treatment was not only feasible, but necessary.

Precisely what Mr. Levine means when he asks whether it is RL's task to "echo official Soviet concoctions" is not clear. The program's run-down of the party and government careers of these men are not "concoctions," they are facts, drab, unimportant facts for RL and the Soviet audience, perhaps, but facts nonetheless.

36. Weekly Commentary on Gaither Report, New York Program Department, 29 December 1957.

RL exploited the widely publicized leaks on the Gaither Report

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to show the existence of, and the need for, freedom of public criticism of official policy in a democracy.

The Commentary certainly should have omitted the strong statements of Alsop on the Gaither Report. At the same time the program definitely indicated that the accuracy of the report's claim that the U.S. defense effort did not meet American defense needs was debatable, and it ended on a note of confidence that this shortcoming, if it in fact existed, would be righted because of the Gaither Report.

This is the last half or more of the broadcast:

"However, [reference to Alsop's claim that the report shows an inadequacy in our defense effort] it is necessary to note that at present the sharpest attacks on the government by certain social circles are occasioned not by the question, which is in any case debatable, to what extent the country's defense effort lags behind those demands placed on it by general technological developments, but, primarily, by the fact that on this question the government continues to pursue a policy of secrecy. Alsop, in the pages of the N.Y. Herald Tribune, calls this policy, the 'road to hell.'

"American public opinion, and together with it many public officials, are demanding more and more resolutely that the report of the Gaither Commission be published and that the government openly acknowledge its errors. This is the sense of what Vice President of the U.S. Nixon meant when he said that he believed that the people should be informed about the facts on which the Report was based. He declared that an open policy is the only healthy policy and that only a frank discussion with the people can bring about a healthy situation.

"The arguments aroused around the Gaither Committee Report can, in the final analysis, lead to a re-examination of American policy on questions of defense, economy and scientific research work. This is inevitable, because the government in any democratic country is compelled to take public opinion into account, even on matters concerning defense. The government must not, of course, publicize various technological details. But the solution in principle on basic questions must be made with the participation of the people and their representatives. The unpublished Report of the Gaither Committee will lead to the result that the unfavorable condition of U.S. defense -- if this condition does in actuality exist -- will be corrected with the support of all the social forces of the country. This is precisely the way in which one of the aspects of any democratic system manifests itself."

36. Interview With

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37. Interview With Langston Hughes; NYFD, 4 January 1958.

It is precisely because, as Mr. Levine points out, the Soviet press and radio devoted millions of words to the tragedy of Little Rock that this interview was most helpful in putting the race situation in the U.S. into perspective. Of course Mr. Hughes spoke of various restrictions on American Negroes, and, of course, the RL interviewer -- as a good propagandist -- intended that he should. For, in the context of these honest admissions, the statements of Mr. Hughes about the admission of Negro writers to the PEN Club, the freedom of American Negro writers to write about race problems, and the existence of a large Negro intelligentsia, which includes doctors, lawyers and journalists, are all that much more effective and convincing. So, in like manner, are Mr. Hughes' assertions that, in spite of existing racial prejudice in the U.S., considerable progress has been made and that steps are continually being taken to overcome that prejudice. The belief of Mr. Hughes in this gradual but continual progress in overcoming racial prejudice in the U.S. is felt throughout the interview.

38. News Feature on the U.S.-USSR Cultural Exchange Agreement; News Desk, 29 January 1958.

It is certain, as Mr. Levine says, that "this entire broadcast deserves the fullest study and analysis as a clue to the problem we are concerned with." To further this study, we reproduce a translation of the complete text of the broadcast as follows:

"On Monday in Washington an Agreement was signed on expanding cultural contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States. No one can have any doubts about the positive significance of this Agreement. Cultural contact will be useful to the Americans, who are not always adequately informed about the Soviet Union. But, this contact is immeasurably more important for the Soviet Union. The Soviet government has altered its position on this question. As late as 1955, Bulganin in Geneva categorically rejected a proposal for the exchange of information between Western countries and the Soviet Union. Since then, however, times have changed.

It is true that, on the insistence of the Soviet Government, American radio programs must first pass through the Soviet censors. It is true that the number of Soviet citizens who will be permitted to see with their own eyes how the Western world lives is, for the time being, limited. It must be noted, however, that the fact of

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the Agreement is in itself more important than one or another restriction. When Communist propaganda asserts that the prohibition against allowing Western information into the Soviet Union protects Soviet citizens against a tendentious distortion of the truth, this is only a clumsy propaganda device. What the Communist leadership really fears is not anti-Soviet propaganda but access (by the Soviet people) to the objective truth. This is much more important and dangerous than anti-Communist attacks of one kind or another. There is only one way to make a correct evaluation of any situation -- through comparison. Up to now, the Soviet government has never given its citizens this opportunity. Let us take a concrete example: Wage rates of workers in the Soviet Union and in the West and the amount of consumer goods this money will buy. On first glance, there is nothing anti-Soviet in this kind of information. But any Soviet worker who has an opportunity to make a comparison will involuntarily ask this question: How is the Socialist system superior to the capitalist system if, under the capitalist system, the economic condition of the workers is considerably better? The same question will arise when the subject of trade unions, for example, is brought up and when it is made clear that in the so-called capitalist world trade unions are frequently stronger than any owner of an enterprise or any organization of enterprise owners.

The fact that this Agreement has been concluded is indisputable evidence of the mighty internal evolution in the Soviet Union, which the Soviet Government must take into account. The meaning of this evolution is clear: the present Soviet Government, as distinguished from Stalin, is compelled to take the people into account. And, in contrast to Stalin, the present Soviet Government is not doing what it wants to do, but what it must do. For this reason, in the final analysis, cultural contact with the West is necessary not to the Soviet Government, but to the Soviet people."

The first paragraph of this script contains introductory remarks, along with the suggestion that something has happened to make the Soviet government retreat on the question of an East-West information exchange program.

The second paragraph discusses the threat to the Soviet regime of objective truth in view of the fact that an objective comparison between life in the Soviet Union and in the West will expose the sham of the Communist claim of the superiority of their system over democratic capitalism.

Mr. Levine,

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Mr. Levine, however, cited only a portion of the final paragraph, and in so doing omitted any reference to the very significant last two sentences of that paragraph. These are key sentences because they should make it abundantly clear to a propagandist that in speaking about evolution in the Soviet Union, RL actually is calling upon the Soviet people to create and exert pressures to compel the Communist leadership, against its will, to modify the system in a more and more democratic direction.

This "evolutionary" approach is a consistent implementation of official RL policy guidance. It has been determined that, in the absence of the elements of a revolutionary situation in the Soviet Union, RL should devote its basic effort to impel forward those developing forces in Soviet society which can contribute to a situation where popular pressures can be increasingly brought to bear on the Communist leadership and where that leadership is made more and more responsive to those pressures. In this way the ground will be prepared for the eventual democratization of the Soviet Union, in the true sense of the word. Should, at some stage in this movement a revolutionary situation develop, RL will adapt to it, with proper policy guidance.

An undeniable prerequisite for this "evolutionary" development is, however, the belief and hope of the Soviet people in their own ability to exert pressure on the Soviet Communist leadership in the direction they, the people, desire. By assuring the people that they are not impotent, that they are responsible for certain changes in the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin, RL is contributing to that prerequisite. For this morale-building propaganda purpose it is not really vital to determine precisely how far the movement away from Stalinism has gone or to what precise extent various social forces have contributed to this movement.

A further characteristic of basic RL policy is that the radio will eschew vilification and denunciation, but will instead adopt a calm, reasoned approach towards the Communist leadership and towards Soviet domestic and international policies in order to carry out its subtly subversive mission. RL presents its listeners, with particular attention to the "power elite" groups in Soviet society, with a variety of thought-provoking material; it tries to win the confidence of its audience by appearing as an independent representative of the legitimate interests of the Soviet people themselves.

39. Weekly News Review Item on Exchange Agreement; News Desk, 3 February 1958.

This item on the Exchange Agreement was one of many in the Weekly News Review.

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News Review. It was a brief run-down on the terms of the Agreement. No interpretative comment was made beyond the routine words criticized by Mr. Levine to the effect that the Agreement shows that peaceful coexistence of different political systems is possible and that agreement between the Soviet Union and the democratic countries of the West is feasible, given good will on both sides.

It is only by ignoring the whole orientation of RL that one can infer from these statements that it is following the Soviet line (we leave out the consideration that one would have difficulty finding in Soviet media the appellation "democratic countries of the West"). For, RL's occasional use of phrases which create the impression of impartiality is intended to make more convincing its actual support of the West against the Soviet Union. This could have been observed in the very next news item in the same News Review program, which clearly indicated where the radio believes the lack of good will exists. For, in its review of Khrushchev's foreign policy speech in Minsk, RL commented:

"It is clear from this speech that the Soviet government considers agreement with the West possible only on terms which it itself lays down. Thus, Khrushchev declared that the Soviet government is prepared to discuss the proposal of President Eisenhower that interplanetary space be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. However, the conditions which he (Khrushchev) proposes for the discussion of this proposal would merely weaken the security system of NATO, without providing for any compensatory guarantees. Repeating Bulganin's words, Khrushchev spoke of the necessity for calling a conference on the 'highest level.' He believes that most of the basic problems could be resolved by such a conference. However, he added that, in order for that conference to be successful, it was necessary for the West to recognize the maintenance of the 'status quo.' In other words, that the West renounce discussion of the questions of the reunification of Germany and the status of the countries of Eastern Europe.

Of course, Khrushchev knows that prior conditions of this kind are completely unacceptable. If he nevertheless considers it necessary to re-emphasize them publicly, instead of discussing them through normal diplomatic channels, he is obviously doing it in order to relieve himself beforehand of responsibility for the possible future failure of the negotiations.

40. Remark in Review of the Press Program About Soviet Science; News Desk, 4 February 1958.

Mr. Levine's

Mr. Levine's statement that RL "did not miss another opportunity to glorify Soviet science," was based only on partial evidence. He quoted only the following portion of one of the statements RL cited from the Manchester Guardian: "Soviet scientists can achieve enormous successes in any field . . . , but refrained from mentioning its continuation, which reads: "(in any field) in the development of which the Soviet leadership concentrates all the necessary resources, even if the people have to live in mud-huts."

The Manchester Guardian introduced this sobering thought after congratulating the U.S. on the Explorer and making the claim that even though Explorer was much lighter than Sputnik, its scientific value is as great. RL played Explorer as a great contribution to peaceful scientific advancement.

41. News Item on Soviet Scientists' Living Conditions in Their Antarctic Base; News Desk, 4 February 1958.

It was a long shot, quite possibly too long a shot, for RL to hope that its report that Soviet Antarctic scientists enjoy all the comforts of life in their base -- central heating, electricity, and washing machines -- would be received by these-amenities-less listeners as ironic. The likelihood is that the Soviet listener would feel a sense of national pride in this.

42. Press Review Item of Egypt-Syria Merger; News Desk, 5 February 1958.

RL had given its own evaluation of the Egyptian-Syrian merger in its News Commentary of the preceding day, 4 February. In this commentary RL used Nasser's "Liberation of Egypt" to discuss that leader's sense of mission for imperialist ends to draw the conclusion:

"It is difficult to predict the outcome of this new Federation. The greatest danger to its future is represented by the unlikelihood that its leaders will find it in them to be satisfied with what they have already achieved. The imperialist dreams of Nasser, so distinctly expressed by him in his 'Philosophy of Revolution,' will, after this new success, undoubtedly urge him further along the road he has charted. And this road actually leads not to a pan-Arab federation, but to the hegemony of Egypt over the other Arab countries. This is the main danger to the newly organized United Arab Republic."

In addition,

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In addition, it should be pointed out that RL had devoted a number of programs to Soviet machinations in the Near East, with special emphasis on this question during the Soviet-created Turkish-Syrian crisis in the late fall -- during the period of Mr. Levine's review. The particular item to which Mr. Levine refers was one among a number of press excerpts published on the United Arab Republic. One of these cited news articles speculated that the United Arab Republic may yet turn out to be a blow to Soviet designs on Egypt and Syria; another emphasized the counter-moves of Iraq and the feeling of a "majority" of the leaders of the other Arab countries that they would place themselves in complete subordination to the Soviet Union by following Egypt and Syria's plans; the third warned Arab countries against Communism. With all these considerations, the reference in Combat to the West's fear of the cut-off of its oil supplies seems not to put undue emphasis on this very justifiable fear. It would, in any case, be helpful to quote more fully from the Combat passage.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that this merger has caused anxiety in the countries, the leaders of which are trying to create the Baghdad-Amman-Riyadh triangle as a counterweight to the Cairo-Damascus axis.

On the other hand, 90% of all Mid-East oil destined for Europe passes through the territories of these two countries, i.e., through the Suez Canal or through the Syrian pipelines. This gives the Western powers grounds for fear."

43. News Item on Kishi's Statement Regarding U.S. Administration of Taiwan; News Desk, 9 February 1958.

While it is hardly fair to say that RL "supports the Kremlin's charges of American imperialism and militarism" by reporting Japanese Premier Kishi's request that Okinawa be returned to Japanese authority, this item could well have been omitted from the news.

It is noteworthy, however, that Mr. Levine did not mention the last line of the same news item inasmuch as he had complained previously that RL had not sufficiently identified the Peiping Government as being Communist, and that it never mentions Nationalist China. This line reads:

In addition, Kishi said in his speech that Japan does not intend to recognize the Chinese Communist government, since it is bound by a peace treaty with the government on the island of Taiwan."

43. News Commentary

44. News Commentary on Projected Summit Conference; News Desk,
12 February 1958.

Mr. Levine charges that RL "effectively undermined the professions and motives and the solemn obligations of the West" in this special commentary on the Summit. He bases his charge on the statement in the introduction to this program that one has to contrast the real aims of the great powers with their propaganda professions in order to determine what one can and cannot expect from a Summit Conference. Mr. Levine also refers to a statement made shortly afterwards that not even the most solemn pact guarantees by itself any kind of peace.

However, it was only in its opening discussion of the first point of the Soviet demands, a non-aggression pact, that RL showed its "objectivity" by pointing to the difference between certain Western Countries' professions and deeds: After citing the violation by Stalin of Soviet non-aggression pacts with Poland, Finland and the Baltic countries, it mentioned the aggression by England and France against Egypt in violation of their U.N. undertaking. It was in this connection that the second statement cited by Mr. Levine was made.

The remainder of the program takes a straight U.S. position on Soviet policy and intentions in its detailed examination of the Summit proposals put forth by the Soviets and the U.S., denigrating only Soviet professions, motives and solemn obligations. The literal degree of RL's support of the U.S. position can be seen from the program's concluding summary:

Chances for the success of the proposed new meeting at the highest level are more than doubtful. The 1955 Geneva Conference also aroused the hopes of the world, but they proved futile. The agreement in principle which was reached at that meeting was almost immediately violated by the Soviet Government. The main point of the Geneva agreement -- the promise to unite Germany on the basis of free elections -- has always been ignored by the Soviet Government. Now, the Soviet Government denies the fact that it made such a promise.

After the Moscow Declaration (of Communist Parties), which openly declares that Communism must be spread by all means, not excluding force; after Khrushchev's speech in Minsk, in which he insisted on maintaining the 'status quo'; after numerous letters by Bulganin -- it is difficult to suppose that a new meeting on the highest level will lead to a reduction of world tensions.

"If the Soviet Government were to give up its reliance on the 'status quo'; if it were to recognize the necessity for

solving the

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solving the German question on the basis of free elections; if it were to fulfill, if only in part, the agreements signed by it in relation to Eastern and Central Europe; if it were to agree to an effective international control over disarmament; if it were to agree to cease the production of hydrogen and atomic weapons -- only in this event would one be able to have faith in the sincerity of its intentions.

Then, only then, would it be possible to hope for the possibility of establishing a lasting peace after a meeting on the highest level. But, inasmuch as the Soviet leadership limits itself to purely propaganda maneuvers and stubbornly refuses to discuss the substance of international problems, one cannot place great hopes on the success of a new meeting on the highest level.

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Attn:

This memo should be attached to
Please excuse this error.

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THANK YOU,

Kathy

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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Mr. Wisner, DD/P		JUN 23 '58
2	1050 "L" Bldg.		
3			
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5			
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
The DCI has asked for your comment on the recommendations contained in para. 3.			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
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			6/23/58

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